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Lesotho is gearing itse lf fo r  a general election scheduled fo r  1998. While questions are 
being asked as to whether these elections w ill he free  and fa ir , and whether they will 
be held under a peaceful atmosphere, they are nevetheless eagerly aw aited by 
enthusiasts and sceptics alike. However, fo r  voters, civil society, analysists and  
observers, these will differ markedly from  the 1993 election. The differences will 
centre on who will conduct them, their context and thrust, and the characteristics o f  
the voting population. These set broad param eters fo r  the elections and constitute 
important variables with consequences f o r  voting in general and its outcome, even 
though "traditional" po litical attitudes might persist among a good  number o f  voters. 
These important issues necessitate a critical comment on the general election which this 
paper is attempting.
Introduction
As Lesotho edges towards the general election scheduled for 1998 the chasm 
that has characterized the country’s polity since the early 1960’s has widened, 
assuming a totally different shape and adding a new dimension to what would 
aptly be termed the "traditional political cleavage’ among the Basotho nation. 
This cleavage or divide had, until June 1997 when it underwent a sudden and 
dramatic change, been epitomized mainly by three bitterly opposed political 
parties - the Basutoland Congress Party |BCP|, Basotho National Party [BNP| 
and Marema-Tlou Freedom Party |M FP|.
The change in the character and shape ot the political cleavage in Lesotho 
followed the emergence on 7 June, 1997 of the Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy [LCD]. The LCD was formed by Ntsu Mokhehle, the ailing 
Lesotho Prime Minister and the then leader o f  the governing BCP, who had, 
clearly lost control over the party that he had founded and led for 45 years
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since 1952. Not only did the LC D 's  formation signal the end o f the BCP, 
BNP and M F P ’s political dominance in Lesotho but it also transformed the 
complexion and composition o f the country’s parliament by reducing the 
governing BCP to a parliamentary opposition and augmenting the number of 
the country’s political parties.
A few weeks before Mokhehle announced that he had formed the LCD, bloody 
clashes over who should control the BCP’s property had occurred between his 
supporters and those o f  his rivals within the BCP, a phenomenon which does 
not bode well for future political contests between the BCP and Mokhehle’s 
LCD. These could, in fact easily entail spurts of violence. Prospects for 
violent clashes between these political parties might be further enhanced by the 
fact that the former BCP’s guerilla army - the Lesotho Liberation Army [LLA] 
formed in the early 1970’s to dislodge Jonathan from power - was never 
disarmed. Both parties have LLA members in their ranks.
The LLA issue and the seizure o f  governmental power by the LCD have 
prompted questions from influential organizations in the country such as the 
Christian Council of Lesotho. These include, what are the broad political 
repercussions o f M okhehle’s action; will there be elections in 1998 as the 
constitution requires and, if so, under what atmosphere will they take place; 
and, what are their challenges for a Lesotho voter? [Makoa, 1997: 2| Yet such 
challenges will not necessarily be new. [Makoa, 1995: 8-12)
Because o f the lack o f data this paper does not attempt to answer these 
difficult, but profoundly challenging, questions. Rather it will, instead, present 
the author’s comment on the context and challenges for 1998 general election, 
using the questions to guide the analysis. It will try to show that, while they 
are a critical indicator and sinew of Lesotho’s fledgling democracy, these 
elections will in the main serve to underscore the voters’ limited role in their 
country’s electoral system.
The context and framework o f  the 1998 Election
The first democratic general election in Lesotho since constitutional rule was 
abolished was held in 1993. However, while a harbinger of constitutional rule, 
the election merely provided an opportunity for voters to elect the most popular 
political party. More precisely, it enabled Lesotho citizens to choose who
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should govern them without tampering with their institutionally and structurally 
determined role in their country’s political system. Lesotho’s constitution 
legitimizes the separation between the voter and the ruler, relegating the former 
to a facilitator in the process o f appointing the rulers who wield real power and 
make policy, while denying him/her control and leverage over the state and 
elected representatives. To this extent, the voter and his/her vote are primarily 
a means for applying the constitution. However, this situation pervades all 
liberal democracies. Being a liberal democracy, Lesotho’s 1998 general 
election will thus occur in an ideological and legal framework which does not 
only have strong managerial bias but also defines the existing political system 
a priori as appropriate, essential and good.
A Lesotho voter’s lack o f control and leverage over the state and his/her 
elected representatives were exposed in 1994 when the country’s two cabinet 
ministers took a three months "unofficial" refuge in neighbouring South Africa 
because of what they termed a plot by some of the Lesotho Defence Force 
[LDF] members to assassinate them. |Makoa, 1996: 17| The country’s voters 
could neither call on the ministers to account for their conduct nor formally 
censure them for the behaviour. Similarly, the voters appeared helpless in the 
face o f a loss or theft by some o f  the parliamentarians of vast amounts of rural 
poverty relief money.
For Lesotho the holding o f periodic general elections is a constitutional 
requirement borne out o f  bitter popular struggles and hard political bargaining. 
The constitution o f the Kingdom of Lesotho provides for mandatory national 
elections after a specified period. [The Constitution of Lesotho, 1993: 57] 
However, an important caveat is that constitutions do not in themselves 
guarantee regular and fair elections. Neither are they always a panacea for 
political conflict. In Lesotho constitutions have often been at the centre of 
political haggling. [Weisfelder, 1974: 8] In fact, Lesotho’s independence 
constitution was still a matter for serious dispute among the main political 
parties when Jonathan suspended it in 1970 [Maqutu, 1990: 257-81.
Restoration o f  democratic rule
The military junta which seized power on 20 January, 1986 finally yielded to 
popular demands tor a constitutional and democratic rule, following sustained 
domestic and international political pressure tor democratization. Initially
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dismissed by many political analysts as the jun ta’s ploy to prolong its stay in 
power, the promise made in February, 1990 by the Ruling Military Council to 
hold free, fair and competitive elections and to hand over the administration 
of the country to an elected civilian government materialized in April, 1993. 
Phisoane Ramaema, the Chairman o f  the Ruling Military Council, organized 
a general election and handed over the administration of the country to the 
victorious Basutoland Congress Party |BCP|.
The dispensation ushered in by the April, 1993 elections was, however, greeted 
by a number o f ugly political episodes with serious implications for internal 
peace and stability. These include the Basotho National Party’s (BNP| 
rejection of the elections results, armed conflict between the army’s two rival 
factions in January 1994, the murder o f the Deputy Prime Minister, S. Baholo, 
in April 1994, strikes by rank-and-file members o f the Lesotho Mounted Police 
[RLMP] and junior prison officers, and a coup d'etat by King Letsie III in 
August, 1994 which toppled the BCP regime temporarily. [Work for Justice 
(50), October 1997: 1] These incidents, especially the king’s coup, prompted 
intervention by the presidents of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
three presidents ordered the reinstatement of the BCP regime, indemnification 
of King Letsie III and those who participated in the coup or enforced it 
violently, recrowning of the late Moshoeshoe II, disbandment ov a commission 
of inquiry set up by the Prime Minister to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the deposition o f King Moshoeshoe II, and his relations with the 
previous governments. King Letsie III formally relinquished the crown to his 
father in January, 1995 in accordance with the conditions of an agreement 
reached with the presidents and the delegation o f the deposed BCP government 
in September, 1994 [The Star, January 1995].
Continuing crisis and some implications fo r  the 1998 Elections
However, the intervention by the three presidents witnessed no end to the 
kingdom’s political woes. The crisis mentioned in the foregoing section 
apparently infected the governing BCP. By the end o f 1995 there were 
gapping divisions within the ruling party’s leadership. The BCP’s 1995 annual 
congress failed to produce a national executive committee as the faction (self- 
styled the "Pressure Group or Progressives"] that failed to gain seats in the 
new committee stymied what was supposed to be an elected executive 
committee comprised o f  its rivals (whom it branded "Conservatives" or
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Majelathoko) by successfully challenging the constitutionality of the conduct 
of the elections and securing the High Court’s injunction annulling them.
The protracted legal and political battles triggered by the Pressure Group’s 
move further deepened the divisions within the BCP, resulting in its formal 
split in June, 1997 when its leader and the Prime Minister o f  Lesotho, Ntsu 
Mokhehle, announced that he had resigned from the BCP and formed a new 
party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy |L C D |, which he immediately 
declared the governing party. [9] Mokhehle’s departure left the BCP in the 
hands o f the Pressure Group o f which the "top-heavy" comprised of all the 
1995 national executive committee members, excluding him. The formation 
of the LCD and its takeover of the country’s administration was condemned by 
Lesotho’s political parties and a section of the civil society led by the Lesotho 
Council o f  Non-governmental Organizations |L C N |. Lesotho’s Upper House 
o f Parliament (Senate) joined the anti-Mokhehle crusade, denouncing the new 
LCD government as unconstitutional and declaring that senators would boycott 
all parliamentary bills passed for scrutiny by the LCD-dominated House of 
Representatives.
Backed by all the country’s political parties, barring the Popular Front for 
Democracy |P F D ], the BCP stepped up a series of protests involving three 
marches on the Royal Palace in Maseru, the capital, and diplomatic lobbies 
directed mainly at the Southern African Development Community [SADC| 
(particularly South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe which had intervened to 
restore democracy to the kingdom after King Letsie 111 had dismissed 
Mokhehle’s government in August, 1994 and foreign missions in Lesotho). 
Newspapers opposed to Ntsu Mokhehle believed that a second intervention by 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe was on the cards. The pro-BCP 
Sesotho tabloid newspaper, MoAfrika, of 18 July 1997, for example, carried 
on its front page a photo o f Presidents Mandela, Mugabe and Nojuma along 
with an article stating that
"sources close to the government of Lesotho confirm that (the mlers of 
Lesotho) Messrs Robert Mugabe, Nelson Mandela and Kctumilc Masire arc 
planning to visit Lesotho to warn Ntsu Mokhchlc that his action is 
unacccntahlc." (Author’s translation and emphasis).
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However, some o f  Lesotho’s newspaper editors and columnists dismissed the 
protests as futile and inconsequential, dubbing the anti-Mokhehle crusade 
mounted by the BCP and its allies devoid of "credibility resulting largely from 
its unwillingness to test Mokhehle’s action in the High Court." [Mopheme - 
The Survivor July 22-28, 19971 Indeed, the anti-Mokhehle campaigns came 
to naught. Yet they raise important issues such as whether the 1998 general 
election will be free and fair, and in what kind of political atmosphere it will 
take place and how will the voter turn-out be |Makoa, 1997: 2|.
The elections fairness, atmosphere and voter turn-out debate
Scepticism about the nature and atmosphere of the 1998 general elections has 
to do largely with Lesotho’s post-independence political history. The 1970 
general elections conducted by the kingdom’s first democratically elected 
government were annulled - to the chagrin of the electorate, opposition political 
parties and independent observers - by the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, the 
late Chief Leabua Jonathan who subsequently ruled by fiat until January, 1986 
when the kingdom’s small army overthrew his government. The political 
events in Lesotho since April 1993, particularly the rather "unfashionable" 
change of government in June, 1997 may have added to and further divided the 
Basotho nation and/or engendered political apathy and cynicism among the 
voters.
However, I argue that these issues are important only if it is assumed that the 
1998 general elections will serve as a catalyst for both economic advancement 
and change in voters’ conception of their interests. Yet it must be noted that 
this assumption makes little or no sense unless it is premised on the rationalist 
theory of political representation. This theory asserts that man is a rational 
being and can, therefore,
"identify his own interests,... and is aware of the wider claims ol the
community. He will therefore use his vote in an intelligent fashion..." (Ball,
1993 : 1 23 )
The rationalist theory is, however, rivalled by an equally potent; but a more 
conservative and sceptical perspective on political representation and voting 
behaviour. This sees "voting behaviour as a habitual activity which can be 
explained by the early socialization experience of the electorate." |Ponton et
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al, 1993: 77] In fact, while not denying that elections are a means o f popular 
participation, some scholars argue that "the existence ot elections does not 
always give voters the ability to exercise real choice." [Hague e ta l ,  1993: 1821 
Indeed, as I have noted earlier, the focus of elections in liberal democracies is 
the choosing o f rulers rather than transferring real power to a voter. Hence 
they are o f  little value to those seeking radical structural changes.
The importance o f voter turn-out at the polls, however, lies not in whether or 
not it will produce a government but rather in the tact that a low voter turn-out 
may be a reflection of the voters’ lack o f or waning confidence in the electoral 
system and democracy. There is little doubt that a combination o f these two 
phenomena might goad people into resorting to unconstitutional avenues to 
attain their objectives. Thus voter turn-out relates to the fundamental principle 
that election results should reflect the wishes of and be acceptable to the people 
for whom they would spawn a government. In other words, the issue in any 
election that purports to be democratic is the extent to which it serves as a 
yardstick for measuring the government’s popular support and legitimacy.
One o f the critical factors that might influence voter turn-out in the country’s 
1998 election is the significance that is attached to them by the voters. In fact, 
this argument seems plausible if we use the 1993 elections as an example. A 
high voter turn-out of 72% was achieved in these elections. The prime factor 
behind this, according to one analyst, was the annulment o f the democratic 
elections and the abolition o f  democracy in 1970, suggesting that the 
importance o f these elections to the voters was that they were a means of 
righting the past wrongs. [Matlosa, 1997: 1471 Likewise, the BCP’s split and 
the circumstances under which it lost governmental power to the LCD might 
inspire rather than dissuade people from voting. But whether or not this saga 
will become the main agenda for the 1998 elections is a matter for conjecture. 
However, there is little doubt that the sudden displacement of the ruling BCP 
by its splinter organization is an important political development which the 
parties contesting the elections will find difficult to ignore.
Voter turn-out at this election might also be a function o f the voters’ subjective 
evaluation of their possible influence over the outcome of the elections. In 
other words, the voters must not only have an array of alternative political 
parties from which to choose, but should also believe that their votes will have 
the desired impact. In a sense, therefore, this serves as a warning that political
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freedom and franchise alone will not necessarily drive voters to the polling 
booths in 1998. Additional variables are the lowering of the voting age from 
21 to 18 years and the running o f the elections by an independent electoral 
commission. Introduced as a result of pressure by opposition parties, the 
commission is believed to be devoid of bias that supposedly characterizes 
government bureaucracies. The lowering o f the voting age will possibly not 
just increase the number o f  voters but have an impact on the "traditional" 
voting patterns since eighteen-year olds may have a different conception of 
politics - that is, they are likely to view their vote as a tool for self- 
improvement rather than as a means o f affirming or expressing personal 
political affiliation.
The 1998 Elections: Choosing rulers and passing judgement on the past?
Notwithstanding their narrow focus, the 1993 elections achieved two important 
twin objectives, namely passing judgement on the past systems and appointing 
the country’s rulers. They also underscored the dictum that dominates 
political discussions in Lesotho, that is, "the nation is a bull". Crudely 
explained, this means that in politics the nation is not just the final arbiter but 
that it appoints and dismisses rulers. Thus the voters will pass judgement on 
the BCP/LCD regime in the next general elections, rewarding or punishing it 
according to its performance in the last five years (of which a compendium is 
provided below to illuminate the argument).
It became clear soon after the March 1993 that the BCP had a limited political 
programme, aiming only at capturing state power denied it by Jonathan in 
1970. Yet the party had presented itself as a bulwark o f democracy, progress, 
anti-corruption, stability, peace, economic and social emancipation, political 
accountability and administrative transparency. However, it failed to develop 
appropriate mechanisms for concretizing these values despite its frenzied public 
declarations that these were national priorites. Instead, the country emerged 
from the 1993 elections "as a case study o f murderous anarchy, requiring 
external intervention and mediation on several occasions." [Weisfelder, 1997: 
35] The key concomitants o f  this anarchy include mutinies by the disciplined 
torces(the army and the police), the assassination o f the then Deputy Prime 
Minister S. Baholo in April, 1994 and the short-lived, but politically onerous, 
King Letsie III’ coup in August, 1994. But the coup and "the mutinies which 
followed were also fostered by inflammatory remarks from the BCP cabinet
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ministers and parliamentarians..." |Weistelder, Ibid| I he remarks included 
public statements by the Prime Minister and his cabinet denouncing the 
Lesotho Defence Force as a BNP’s murderous youth league that needed to be 
disbanded.
Not only did the regime exclude its opponents trom the administrative and 
governmental processes but it also appeared determined to stoke political 
instability and violence. Examples o f  this double-pronged policy are the 
purging o f the civil service and the security forces, secret importation and 
stockpiling o f weapons o f war, and the training of BCP members in their use 
so that they could challenge the army and eradicate the opposition. On the 
other hand, the regime demonstrated no determination to translate its "clean 
and good governace" rhetoric into a national programme in spite of its claim 
that it was committed to this principle. Instead, as one analyst observes, it 
publicly defended acts of mismanagement, pilferage and fraud occurring within 
state corporations, branding reports by the independent media as attempts to 
destabilize it. [Selinyane, 1997: 23]
The 1993 elections thus produced a largely irresponsive and unaccountable 
regime, unable to deliver on critical electoral promises of national security, 
anti-corruption and economic prosperity. However, this in part reflects the 
weaknesses o f Lesotho’s system of political representation and the voters’ 
misconception o f elections. Yet there is a need to qualify this observation by 
means of simple, but clarifying, questions lest it becomes a meaningless and 
misleading tautology. Should we expect a change in voters’ behaviour in the 
1998 election and if so, what exactly should we expect?
Arguably, if the people who voted for the BCP in 1993 were its members, 
little or insignificant change can be expected. It is also likely that, whatever 
the challenges o f the coming elections, people will vote for their individual 
political parties rather than policies. The reasons for this are many and varied, 
but they usually encapsulate personal gratification and self-identity. In fact, the 
political polarization in Lesotho offers a wide scope for this type o f voting 
behaviour. To some degree it also determines political priorities and reinforces 
the feeling among the Lesotho population that going to the voting booths means 
going to defeat or vanquish political opponents. It is a means of reaffirming 
the followers’ support for their party leadership and membership. Thus
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diehard members of Lesotho’s political parties invariably see winning power 
for their leaders as a key raison de'tre  for voting in an election.
Clearly, therefore, the 1998 election will not only raise the important questions 
mentioned earlier in this analysis but also present daunting challenges for the 
voters. Some o f  the most important challenges, in my view are:
how to convert their votes into mechanisms for effective popular 
intervention as the need arises in order to ensure that voters have some 
degree o f control over their elected representatives, government and 
the state;
using their votes to forge an accountable government that is responsive 
to popular demands;
translating the votes into an antidote for the damaging power struggles 
that have dogged the Basotho nation since the early 1960’s;
and voting for policies rather than simply bestowing power on their 
individual political parties.
Conclusions
Lesotho’s 1998 general election is unlikely to evoke as much fervour as was 
the case with the 1993 election. For the majority o f  Lesotho citizens the latter 
marked a march to freedom after more than two decades o f political 
repression. However, this is not a sufficient predictor o f  voter turn out 
because the agendas o f these two elections are radically different. The 1998 
election is likely to be about "routinizing" the freedom and democracy won in 
March, 1993. Yet it poses stark challenges for the voter, namely how to use 
his/her vote to gain a greater access to political power and resources and to 
increase his/her control over the elected representatives.
Unfortunately, as 1 have demonstrated earlier, Lesotho’s political system offers 
little or no scope for popular control. Not only does it limit the voters’ options 
but also relegates the voting population to a source of votes for political power 
aspirants. Thus the task o f a Lesotho voter in the 1998 general election should 
be the selection o f the best representatives, that is, those dedicated to serving
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the nation. But this presupposes not only the presence of a clear selection 
criteria, but also the availability o f  such a calibre ot candidates.
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